Why would Liverpool, a club whose identity for the past decade has been defined by gegenpressing, verticality, and the emotional architecture of Jürgen Klopp, turn to a Basque coach whose best work at Bournemouth was built on structured possession and a mid-block? The answer, if Sky Sports’ report that the two sides have reached a verbal agreement is borne out, is that the club’s hierarchy believe the next phase requires a different kind of control. Arne Slot’s 4-2-3-1 produced compelling football in its first months, but the structural vulnerabilities, particularly against back-three systems that refused the back-pass, never fully resolved. Andoni Iraola offers a different solution to the same problem: how to dominate games without surrendering the transitions that have haunted Liverpool since the high line became a liability rather than a weapon.
To understand what Liverpool are betting on, you have to start with what Iraola built at Bournemouth, and why it mattered.
The base shape, in possession at Dean Court, was a 4-2-3-1 that behaved, in its build-up phase, like a 3-2-5. The left-back, either Milos Kerkez or the adapted Lloyd Kelly, stepped into the left half-space alongside the single pivot, while the right-back stayed wider and higher. The two centre-backs split to the edges of the penalty area. The front line held width, with the ten, whoever filled that role, drifting into the right half-space to create a box midfield of four when the ball was on the left side. It was not revolutionary. What was revolutionary, for a club of Bournemouth’s resource level, was the consistency of the structure and the discipline of the pressing triggers.
Iraola’s Bournemouth pressed in a 4-4-2 block out of possession. The front two, usually Dominic Solanke and a rotating partner, cut the passing lanes to the opposition’s double pivot. The wingers tucked in to form a flat midfield four. The full-backs stayed narrow. The defensive line sat at a medium height, roughly 38 metres from their own goal, and the trigger for the press was not the back-pass to the goalkeeper, as it was under Klopp, but the first lateral pass into a centre-back who had already received under pressure. The difference is subtle but significant. Klopp’s press was triggered by the goalkeeper’s involvement, which meant the entire defensive line would step up simultaneously, compressing the space behind. Iraola’s press was triggered by the centre-back’s body orientation. If the centre-back received with his back to the pitch, the nearest Bournemouth forward would close, and the shape would shift to a 4-3-3 press with the ten stepping up to mark the pivot. If the centre-back received open, the press was delayed, and the block held.
The PPDA, according to StatsBomb’s model, averaged 9.8 across Iraola’s final season at Bournemouth. That is not a high press by Premier League standards; Manchester City under Guardiola averaged 10.2 in the same period. But the pressing intensity, measured by the percentage of opposition passes made under pressure, was 34 per cent, which placed Bournemouth in the top six. The press was selective, not relentless. It was designed to force errors in specific zones, usually the half-space between the opposition’s centre-back and full-back, rather than to win the ball high and counter immediately.
The build-up phase is where Iraola’s geometry becomes most interesting. Bournemouth’s centre-backs, in the first phase, would split to a width of roughly 28 metres. The goalkeeper, Neto in the early months and then Mark Travers, would drop into the left channel, creating a back-three with the left centre-back and the inverted left-back. The right centre-back would hold the right edge of the penalty area. The double pivot, usually Lewis Cook and the more progressive Ryan Christie or Tyler Adams, would position themselves in the two half-spaces between the centre-backs and the full-backs. The shape, from above, resembled a 3-2-2-3, with the front three holding the width and the ten occupying the right half-space.
The key tactical instruction was the movement of the ten. In Iraola’s system, the number ten was not a free-roaming playmaker. He was a positional player whose job was to create the overload in the right half-space that allowed the right winger to isolate the opposition left-back one-on-one. When the ball was on the left side, the ten would drift right, drawing the opposition’s pivot with him, and the right winger would receive in space. When the ball was on the right side, the ten would step into the channel between the opposition’s centre-back and full-back, creating a 3v2 that Bournemouth could exploit with quick combinations. Marcus Tavernier, in the ten role for much of the 2023-24 season, averaged 4.2 progressive passes per 90 and 2.3 shot-creating actions per 90, according to StatsBomb. Those are not eye-catching numbers, but they reflect a player who was creating the conditions for others rather than finishing them himself.
The 68th minute of Bournemouth’s 3-2 win over Tottenham in April 2024 is the diagram-paragraph that explains Iraola’s philosophy. Travers received from the left centre-back, Kerkez dropped into the left half-space, Cook stepped into the right half-space, Christie pushed up to the ten position, and the ball was switched to the right-back. The right-back played a diagonal to the right winger, who had been isolated by the ten’s movement. The winger crossed. Solanke headed over. The xG of the sequence was 0.14, but the geometry was the point: every player knew where to be, and the movement of the ten created the space that the winger exploited.
What does this mean for Liverpool? The first question is whether Iraola’s 4-2-3-1 can accommodate the personnel Anfield already has. Mohamed Salah, at 32, is not a player who holds width and waits for isolation. He is a player who cuts inside, attacks the back-post channel, and creates from movement rather than position. Cody Gakpo, on the left, is similarly inclined to drift inside. Florian Wirtz, if he arrives, is a ten who wants to receive between the lines and turn, not a positional player who creates space for others. The fit is not obvious.
The second question is the pressing trigger. Liverpool’s high line, under Klopp, was built on the back-pass trigger. Iraola’s mid-block, at Bournemouth, was built on the body-orientation trigger. If Iraola keeps the mid-block at Anfield, he is asking the centre-backs to defend more space behind them, which demands a recovery pace that Ibrahima Konaté has but that the squad as a whole may not. If he raises the line to match Klopp’s, he loses the selectivity of the press that made Bournemouth effective.
The third question, and the one that will define Iraola’s first season, is the right-back role. Trent Alexander-Arnold’s inverted full-back function was central to Slot’s build-up, but it required a specific kind of centre-back partnership behind him, one that could cover the space he vacated. Iraola’s system at Bournemouth used the left-back as the inverted player, not the right. If Alexander-Arnold stays, Iraola has to decide whether to adapt the system to the player or the player to the system. The verbal agreement, as reported by Sky Sports, suggests that conversation has already begun.
The forward-looking constraint is this. Liverpool’s next problem is not the press. It is the space between the press and the defence. Iraola’s Bournemouth solved it with a mid-block that was patient, selective, and structured. Whether that patience is compatible with Anfield’s expectation of dominance, and with a squad built for verticality rather than control, is the question that will define the next chapter.
